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PRIVATIZED COMMUNITIES AND THE 
"SECESSION OF THE SUCCESSFUL": 
DEMOCRACY AND FAIRNESS 
BEYOND THE GATE 
Sheryll D. Cashin* 
The fabric of civitas, communal commitment to civic and public 
life, has begun to rip. 1 
* * * 
[A} house divided against itself cannot stand.2 
* * * 
I am trying to envision what happens when 10 or 20 percent of the 
population has enough income to bypass the social institutions it 
doesn't like in ways that only the top fraction of 1 percent used to 
be able to do. . . . The Left has been complaining for years that 
the rich have too much power. They ain't seen nothing yet. 3 
INTRODUCTION 
In the twentieth century we became a nation of homeowners. 
Thanks to a phalanx of federal policies that facilitated broad avail-
ability of credit for buying a home and stimulated housing produc-
tion targeted to the middle class, by the dawn of the New 
Millennium an historic high of sixty-seven percent of the American 
population were homeowners.4 Among this vast majority of 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Empowerment Zones, Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment ("HUD"), assigned to Vice President Al Gore (1995-96); Director for 
Community Development, National Economic Council, The White House (1993-95). 
1. EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED 
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 176 (1997). 
2. Id. at 177 (quoting Abraham Lincoln). 
3. Irwin M. Stelzer, The Shape of Things to Come, NAT'L REV., July 8, 1991, at 
29-30 (quoting Charles Murray). 
4. Press Release, Hous. & Urban Dev. Comm'n, Cuomo Says America's Home-
ownership Rate Hits Record High of 67 Percent, With 70.5 Million Families Owning 
Their Homes (Oct. 28, 1999) (crediting Clinton Administration economic policies 
with raising American's homeownership rate to a record high of sixty-seven percent) 
(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal), http://www.hud.gov/library/book-
shelf18/pressrellpr99-220.html. For a discussion of federal housing policies that stimu-
lated homeownership lending and production, and the racially discriminatory policies 
that limited minority homeownership opportunities, see DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & 
1675 
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American property owners is a significant and growing subset who 
live in common interest developments ("CIDs"). Emanating from 
Ebenezer Howard's seminal conception of the garden city,S CIDs 
typically require owners who buy units in the development to pay 
monthly or annual fees to a residential association that manages 
common areas, provides desired services, and enforces rules or 
covenants that apply to all who live in the development. CIDs in-
clude planned unit developments of single-family homes, condo-
miniums, and cooperative apartments.6 
As of 1998, about forty-two million Americans were living in 
CIDs, representing approximately fifteen percent of the U.S. popu-
lation.7 At least eight million members of this CID population re-
side in gated communities.8 The explosive growth of CIDs is 
evidenced by the upward trajectory of the homeowners associa-
tions that govern them. Between 1964 and 1992, the number of 
homeowners associations grew from a mere 500 to 150,000.9 By 
1998, that number had reached 205,000.10 The Community As-
sociations Institute ("CAl") once estimated that by the year 2000, 
225,000 such private governance organizations would be formed,11 
representing about twenty percent of all U.S. homeowners,u This 
privatized governance "may soon rival the 39,000 elected local gov-
ernments in numbers and power over individuals."13 
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF 
THE UNDERCLASS 54-55 (1993); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985). 
5. See generally EBENEZER HOWARD, GARDEN CITIES OF TOMORROW (M.I.T. 
Press 1965) (1902). First published in 1902, Howard's book was "a manual for the 
financing, building, and operation of a new kind of planned community" that married 
comprehensive physical planning with political and economic organization. EVAN Mc-
KENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL 
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 2-3 (1994) (discussing Howard's "garden city" theory). 
6. McKENZIE, supra note 5, at 7. 
7. Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zon-
ing with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 827, 829 (1999) (citing CLIFFORD J. TREESE, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 
FACTBOOK 3 (1999)). 
8. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 180 n.1 (estimating that approximately 
8.4 million people live in gated communities, but acknowledging that this figure "may 
be biased upwards"). 
9. McKENZIE, supra note 5, at 11. 
10. Nelson, supra note 7, at 829. 
11. McKENZIE, supra note 5, at 11 & n.41 (citing CAl estimates). 
12. Nelson, supra note 7, at 863 (citing ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD 
POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 145 
(1992)). 
13. PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 175 (1995). 
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Among the services that homeowners associations typically pro-
vide, in exchange for mandatory fees paid by CID residents, are 
trash and snow removal, road maintenance, and recreational facili-
ties.14 These private contractual arrangements for the provision of 
formerly "public" services have put the nation on a course toward 
civic secession. The wedge begins with the creation of a large class 
of property owners the members of which increasingly feel that 
they are paying twice-in the form of property taxes and residen-
tial association fees for privately administered services. This atti-
tude threatens to predominate in the twenty-first century because 
in areas of rapid growth, most new residential developments now 
take the form of aCID. 15 
The schism widens when one considers the quality of response to 
community membership cultivated by CIDs. Residents of CIDs 
tend to view themselves as taxpayers rather than citizens, and they 
often perceive local property taxes as a fee for services they should 
receive rather than their contribution to services local government 
must provide to the community as a whole.16 Several states, in-
cluding Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, and Texas, already allow 
for adjustments in local taxes for residents of CIDs to reflect ser-
vices provided by their residential associationsP At first blush, 
this may seem fair. According to the theory supporting such tax 
adjustments, CIDs are providing services that are public in nature, 
for example, by maintaining roads and park-like spaces that are 
open to the public. Hence, proponents of such adjustments argue 
that the tax code should be used to allow deductions or abatements 
to private citizens who pay assessments for such public goods or 
benefits. IS 
This conception of the CID's contribution toward public goods 
belies reality. Although most CIDs are not physically gated, by 
design they are privatized spaces. Frequently, the streets and rec-
reational amenities in CIDs are restricted to residents and their 
guests.19 CIDs offer their residents a private utopia-a 
14. Infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
15. McKENZIE, supra note 5, at 11-12. 
16. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 139-40; Andrew Stark, America, The 
Gated?, WILSON Q., Jan. 1998, at 58, 67 (noting that advocates for tax rebates to 
common interest community residents "believe that 'the purpose of government is to 
give you back everything in services that you give it in payments, not to take your 
money and use it for the benefit of others''') (quoting Doug Kleine, former head of 
the research arm of CAl). 
17. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 24. 
18. Stark, supra note 16, at 69. 
19. KANTOR, supra note 13, at 175. 
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"privatopia" as one scholar labeled it2°-in which they "can set 
their own taxes in the form of assessments, use them for services 
they choose, and restrict those benefits to themselves and their im-
mediate neighbors. "21 Outsiders who cannot afford properties in a 
CID cannot participate in its homeowners association.· Outsiders, 
moreover, are not likely to benefit directly from the services most 
commonly provided by CIDs, such as landscaping, snow removal, 
garbage collection, swimming pools, street lights, and street 
cleaning.22 
But the potential schism between CID residents and those who 
do not live in CIDs goes much farther. The secessionist mind set 
cultivated by CIDs has crossed an intellectual firewall. In a few 
jurisdictions, the previously accepted understanding that public tax 
support should not be available for facilities that are wholly private 
or exclusive has given way. In 1996, for example, the private gated 
community of Panther Valley near Hackettstown, New Jersey was 
allowed to set up a special taxing district for the maintenance of 
roads that are wholly closed to the general public. As a result, the 
residents of Panther Valley are able to deduct what they spend for 
private road maintenance from their federal and state income tax 
returns.23 Several nearly identical arrangements reportedly have 
been created in Florida.24 
This and other forms of "civic secession" have been occurring 
across the country. At the extreme, a CID formally secedes from 
the surrounding city or county, forming its own incorporated mu-
nicipal government. With such formal secession, the common in-
terest community gains the regulatory powers, particularly zoning 
powers, that enable it to attract desired entrants and wall out popu-
lations deemed undesirable. This practice of exclusion is the famil-
iar, unfortunate way of the American suburb.25 In this essay, I will 
reflect on how CIDs, and their privatized spaces, are contributing 
to a broader phenomenon of civic secession, primarily by affluent 
property owners. In particular, I will analyze the way in which 
CIDs may affect electoral politics and the allocation of public re-
20. McKENZIE, supra note 5. 
21. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 24-25. 
22. Id. at 25 tbl.1-1 (listing services provided by homeowner associations in declin-
ing order of frequency). Less common services, in declining order, included club-
houses, tennis courts, playgrounds, parks, basketball courts, and libraries. Id. 
23. Stark, supra note 16, at 78-79. 
24. [d. at 79. 
25. See generally JACKSON, supra note 4; MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS 
OF EXCLUSION (1976). 
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sources by federal and state government. The chief threat of CIDs 
is that they exacerbate inequality in America while also exacerbat-
ing the challenges of governing. By giving the private property 
owner a formal context in which to feel justified in her view that 
she is "doing her part" simply by paying her way for services, it will 
be increasingly difficult in the twenty-first century to establish a 
mandate for governmental policy, whether federal, state, or local, 
that requires shared sacrifice. Because most CIDs are extremely 
homogenous in terms of race and class, it will be particularly diffi-
cult to build a consensus for public policies that are perceived as 
benefiting racial and economic groups that are underrepresented in 
the CID, property-holding class.26 
I. SECESSION OF THE SUCCESSFUL-How CIDs AITENUATE 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
Robert B. Reich, former Secretary of Labor, first coined the 
phrase "secession of the successful"'and drew attention to the risks 
to the social fabric wrought by the so-called new economy and 
suburbanization.27 CIDs are part of this larger phenomenon. In 
this Part, I offer several theories as to how CIDs attenuate the so-
cial contract: (1) they cultivate property owners rather than citi-
zens; (2) they harness economic and racial homogeneity; and (3) 
they predominate in new, outer-ring suburban developments, 
thereby contributing to an existing phenomenon of regional 
polarization. 
A. Property Owner Consciousness 
A governance mechanism constructed primarily to protect and 
preserve private property rights does not build a sense of commu-
nity. Instead, it cultivates an attitude that is a driving force animat-
ing property rights. As some have argued, private property 
26. In this essay, I suggest only the potential costs to society of the proliferation of 
ClDs. I have not attempted to analyze the benefits to eID residents of participating in 
a homeowners association; no doubt, eID residents experience benefits in terms of 
service delivery and protection of property values. Nor have I attempted to analyze 
the benefits to society of ClDs. Implicit in my critique, however, is a suggestion that 
any such benefits are likely outweighed by the social costs I have identified. I wish to 
make clear that I have not yet done the empirical research and analytical work to 
justify such an assumption. My goal in this brief essay is solely to set out an intui-
tion-a strongly felt one-as to the likely long-term costs of the residential privatiza-
tion movement. 
27. Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 
(Magazine), at 16. 
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ownership enables the individual owner, acting autonomously, to 
internalize most of the costs and benefits associated with the prop-
erty owned.28 In other words, the quality of relationship between 
the individual and the state that is cultivated by CIDs is one of a 
private property owner rather than a citizen. The essence of pri-
vate property ownership is that the property owner will be secure 
in the expectation that the state will support her right to exclude 
others from her property as well as derive exclusive benefits in the 
use of that property.29 Private property rights are necessarily pre-
mised upon rational maximization of self-interest. 
Citizenship, on the other hand, is premised on the idea of owing 
allegiance to a state or government in which sovereign power is 
retained by the people and political rights are shared by all mem-
bers of the polity. A citizen thus owes allegiance to a larger com-
munity and, in turn, expects to be protected by her sovereign 
government. It is questionable whether CIDs even do a good job 
of promoting a sense of community among their residents. As Ed-
ward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder note: 
Studies of homeowner associations have found little evidence 
that they breed higher levels of participation and self-govern-
ance. Robert Dilger attributes this effect to flaws in the struc-
ture of [homeowner associations] and to the free-rider 
problem-because participation is voluntary, a few individuals 
do most of the work, and as long as there are no glaring 
problems, the majority feel safe leaving those few to bear the 
burden of running the association.3° 
Others attribute the lack of participation in homeowner associa-
tions to the fact that the association is premised upon individual 
member goals of protecting private property. The payment of fees, 
which are in turn applied collectively to services that protect and 
enhance property values, is the sole rationale for the homeowner 
association. In this sense, there is nothing in the homeowner asso-
ciation structure that engenders a participatory consciousnessY 
28. E.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347 (1967). 
29. E.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 67-69 (Harcourt, Brace & 
Co. 1931) (1840). 
30. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 35 (citing ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGH-
BORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN Gov-
ERNANCE 111 (1992)). 
31. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 34-35. Beyond participation in the 
homeowner association, Blakely and Snyder suggest, in their study of gated communi-
ties, that the quality of community engendered in ClDs is somewhat impoverished. In 
the extreme form of the gated community, private gates create privacy rather than 
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The CID structure thus doubly undermines the notion of citizen-
ship and participation in a larger polity. First, participation in the 
CID is premised upon property ownership rather than the concept 
of one person, one vote, which demarcates a reduced, privatized 
sphere of fealty for the CID resident. Second, the civic or public 
realm within the CID is impoverished because the sole rationale 
for the homeowners association is protecting private property, and 
direct engagement with the CID community is not required to do 
this. 
B. Homogeneity 
Although homogeneity is not intrinsic to the CID concept, in 
practice CIDs tend to be highly homogeneous by income and 
race.32 Economic and racial selection is fueled by the practices of 
real estate developers and other actors in the real estate industry. 
Developers tend to tailor new planned developments to particular 
income brackets, and the real estate industry is notorious for racial 
steering that contributes to a high degree of racial segregation, par-
ticularly of African Americans.33 Because CIDs are becoming the 
norm in high-growth, developing areas, the widespread use of ex-
clusionary zoning in such areas also contributes to the homogeneity 
of CIDs. 
The homogeneity of CIDs, like the homogeneity of most devel-
oping suburbs, contributes to the phenomenon of civic secession. 
As Blakely and Snyder suggest, it is difficult to maintain the social 
contract in a context of increasingly formalized separation of dif-
fering classes and races.34 Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence 
that the desire for homogeneity, particularly by whites, has been 
community. Blakely and Snyder note that residents tend to keep to themselves and do 
not interact with each other. See generally id. Similarly, one empirical study of gated 
communities suggests that relying on the gate and hired security guards creates a false 
sense of security. Because residents believe that the gated community provides ade-
quate security, they feel no ownership in the protection of community assets. This 
bulwarking approach to defensible space lacks the element of social responsibility 
needed to create natural surveillance and community bonding, which is essential for 
territorial functioning to succeed. Georjeanna Wilson-Doenges, An Exploration of 
Sense of Community and Fear of Crime in Gated Communities, 32 ENV'T & BEHAV. 
597,608 (2000). 
32. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 148-49. 
33. Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A 
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 743-44 
(2001) (discussing racial steering and selective marketing practices by the real estate 
industry). 
34. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 154-55. 
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the chief impetus for the creation of new suburban localities.35 
One resident of a suburb poignantly accepted this attitude: 
See, you have to understand the fundamental feeling in suburbia 
is fear, let's face it. The basic emotional feeling is fear. Fear of 
blacks, fear of physical harm, fear of their kids being subjected 
to drugs, which are identified as a black problem, fear of all the 
urban ills. They feel [that] by moving to the suburbs they've run 
away from it, in fact, they haven't, in reality they haven't, but in 
their own mind's eye they've moved away from the problem.36 
CIDs, particularly those that are gated, also are premised in part 
on assuaging a fear of "other." For example, one marketing bro-
chure for a gated community north of Dallas called upon prospec-
tive residents to imagine a "'perfect place to live . . . outside the 
pandemonium of the city,' where there can be 'a return to simpler 
times, when you knew you were secure within the boundaries of 
your own neighborhood ... [and] where children could play unat-
tended and be safe after dark.' "37 Indeed, gated communities and 
CIDs generally are most common in those parts of the country 
where foreign immigration has been highest.38 Blakely and Snyder 
conclude that "gated areas ... represent[ ] a concrete metaphor for 
the closing of the gates against immigrants and minorities and the 
poverty, crime and social instabilities in society at large."39 
As a result of this homogeneity, the possibility for cooperation 
between CID and non-CID communities is lessened.40 Homogene-
ity also decreases the potential for empathy with racial and eco-
nomic groups that are not represented in the CID because of a lack 
35. Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored 
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.1. 1985, 1993-94 
(2000) (noting that the desire for racial exclusion was a dominant factor in the forma-
tion of new suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s). 
36. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 155-56 (quoting a participant from a 
study on community and place). 
37. David Dillon, Fortress America: More and More of Us are Living Behind 
Locked Gates, PLAN., June 1994, at 8. 
38. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 152 (noting this proliferation in both 
California and Florida). Blakely and Snyder also report that the seven states that 
experienced an unprecedented wave of foreign immigration in the 1980s simultane-
ously encountered significant white out-migration. Id. (discussing this migration pat-
tern in California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Texas). 
Many of the states to which whites are fleeing also have experienced a rapid increased 
in gated communities. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Cashin, supra note 35, at 2019-20 (citing empirical research on the formation 
of inter-local agreements, and noting that predominately white localities only enter 
into such agreements with localities that have a similar racial composition). 
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of direct daily experience with such groups. Finally, where homo-
geneity is achieved, protecting it often becomes a primary ratio-
nale, which in turn may encourage CID residents to support 
exclusionary policies that limit certain opportunities for non-CID 
residents.41 
c. Privatization Mainly for New Suburban Developments 
As of 1990, fifty-one percent of CIDs were planned-unit devel-
opments of single-family homes, while forty-two percent were con-
dominiums and seven percent were cooperatives.42 In the twenty-
first century, CIDs are likely to predominate in high-growth, outer-
ring areas, where most new residential subdivisions are being de-
veloped. CIDs are likely to be more limited in the urbanized core 
because the transaction costs of organizing an existing neighbor-
hood into a CID are considerable. It is much easier to impose a 
regime of mutually enforceable restrictive covenants, including 
mandatory membership and payment of fees to a homeowner asso-
ciation, when a new residential community is being formed for the 
first time.43 CID formation in the urban core has been limited 
mainly to public street closings, which are more likely to arouse 
opposition by prior users of public streets.44 
If CIDs predominate in outer-ring suburbs, this will only acceler-
ate a process of regional polarization that has been occurring in 
many metropolitan areas across the nation. In the typical Ameri-
can metropolis, an affluent, outer-ring quadrant garners the major-
ity of the region's public infrastructure investments and the vast 
majority of the region's economic growth, while using local powers 
to effectively wall itself off from most of the region's social service 
burdens.45 Citizens in the outer-ring thus enjoy the best retail and 
commercial amenities, the best schools, and the strongest tax base, 
with concomitant low tax rates. Meanwhile, citizens of the urban 
41. Id. at 2019-22 (citing evidence on the impact of homogeneity in exacerbating 
political competition and social tension in metropolitan regions). 
42. McKENZIE, supra note 5, at 1l. 
43. Cf Sanborn v. McClean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925) (upholding a reciprocal 
negative easement barring commercial uses in a single family subdivision, and ex-
plaining that such restrictions "fastened" to the entire subdivision at the time it was 
held by a common owner, the original developer). 
44. According to the CAl, developers of CIDs typically are interested in undevel-
oped areas; they rarely develop property in preexisting neighborhoods because of the 
costs associated with such development. When a CID does form in a preexisting 
neighborhood, it usually is the result of current residents organizing themselves. Inter-
view with staff of Community Associations Institute (Mar. 19, 2001). 
45. Cashin, supra note 35, at 2002-15. 
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core often are saddled with a concentration of poverty, rising ser-
vice demands, higher taxes, and a shrinking or stagnant tax base.46 
A concentration and cultivation of a CID, property-owning class in 
the outer-ring threatens to exacerbate this rift by entrenching a be-
lief among affluent property owners that they need not contribute 
to a regional tax base, much less participate in solving problems 
that transcend local borders or individual neighborhoods. 
Although a CID resident might feel justified in maintaining such 
a secessionist viewpoint, outer-ring CID developments often bene-
fit from state expenditures on their behalf. Often, "[t]heir streets, 
fire hydrants, street lamps, and other facilities were paved, in-
stalled, or constructed at public expense. "47 The extent to which 
CIDs are subsidized by the non-CID polity should be studied and 
documented.48 Many states and counties have been getting 
smarter, imposing exactions that force developers (or their buyers) 
to assume a greater percentage of the cost for the often-duplicative 
new infrastructures necessary to create new planned unit develop-
ments.49 However, empirical evidence suggests that a great deal of 
cross-subsidization is occurring in metropolitan regions: citizens of 
the urbanized core are subsidizing development in affluent, high-
growth communities where CIDs are concentrated.50 This reality 
highlights the fairness and equity concerns surrounding the priva-
tization of residential communities. Scholars and observers of this 
movement will be called upon increasingly to grapple with the 
question of whether an affluent class of property owners should be 
able to use privatization techniques to protect their tax base while 
continuing to garner certain benefits, including subsidies and work-
ers, from the non-CID polity. 
II. CIVIC SECESSION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
CIDs create a risk that, as more and more citizens separate 
themselves into homogenous private communities, their ties to the 
46. Id. at 2022-27. 
47. David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Im-
pact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 774 (1995). 
48. In researching this essay, I was unable to find such data. According to the 
CAl, there is no system for registering CIDs-registration or membership with CAl is 
completely voluntary-which makes it difficult to collect data or assess the external 
costs to surrounding municipalities of CID development. Interview with staff of Com-
munity Associations Institute (Mar. 19, 2001). 
49. See generally Susan M. Denbo, Development Exactions: A New Way to Fund 
State and Local Government Infrastructure Improvements and Affordable Housing?, 
23 REAL EST. L.J. 7 (1994). 
50. Cashin, supra note 35, at 2004-09. 
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larger polity will become attenuated and they will increasingly re-
sist governmental efforts to address problems that they do not per-
ceive as "theirs." As much as twenty percent of the U.S. 
population now live in CIDs, and this growing segment is becoming 
an increasingly organized and vocal constituency, particularly 
around the issue of tax adjustment.51 Residents of CIDs have the 
advantage of being organized via their homeowners associations. 
More importantly, the CID's mandatory fee-for-service arrange-
ment encourages CID residents in the belief that they should have 
a limited fiscal obligation beyond their immediate community. 
In California, Florida and other states with permissive govern-
ment formation laws, developers are working with [CID] re-
sidents to create cities that are separate from the existing 
jurisdiction-city or county. People find these new cities, cre-
ated by secession, attractive for many reasons. Using housing 
and growth regulations, the new jurisdictions can pass regula-
tory ordinances that restrict new entrants. And they can direct 
publicly collected taxes to locally specified goals rather than al-
lowing them to be used over a larger area,sz 
Thus, CIDs can facilitate both an informal form of secession in 
which CID residents procure a tax adjustment for their homeowner 
association fees and a more extreme, formal secession in which 
CID residents form their own local government and cut ties to sur-
rounding jurisdictions. Beyond such formal or informal secession, 
the proliferation of CIDs, like the proliferation of new suburban 
governments that has accompanied five decades of suburbaniza-
tion,53 is likely to have an impact on the political economy. In this 
Part, I offer evidence of secessionist attitudes among suburban vot-
ers and conjecture as to the likely impact of CIDs on the political 
economy as they become an increasingly dominant form of home 
ownership in the new century. I then suggest how the proliferation 
of the CID, property-owning class may accelerate structural inequi-
ties in the American metropolis. 
51. Kennedy, supra note 47, at 774-77; Stark, supra note 16, at 66-69 (describing 
the movement to make homeowners association fees tax deductible). 
52. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 25; see also KANTOR, supra note 13, at 
164 (explaining the economic rationale for defensive incorporation of a new munici-
pality, including the ability to cut ties to the central city with its higher taxes and 
redistributive expenditures). 
53. Cashin, supra note 35, at 1992 (noting that the number of municipalities and 
special districts doubled from 24,500 to 50,834 between 1942 and 1992). 
HeinOnline -- 28 Fordham Urb. L.J.  1686 2000-2001
1686 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL1Voi. XXVIII 
A. Evidence of Secessionist Voter Attitudes: Electoral Politics 
Empirical research by political scientists and public finance 
scholars suggests that decentralization of the polity limits its capac-
ity for shared sacrifice or redistributive spending. For example, at 
the state level, the outcome of most fiscal debates is determined by 
suburban, middle-class voters.54 Elsewhere, I have marshaled ex-
tensive evidence demonstrating that, at the state level, voters exact 
a high penalty against state elected officials for redistributive 
spending.55 In particular, voters in state elections display singular 
antipathy toward welfare spending. They dislike this type of 
spending three times more than they dislike any other type of 
spending. 56 At the same time, voters do not penalize presidents in 
national elections for welfare spending.57 
This phenomenon suggests a limit to my theory. Although the 
fragmentation of the polity into homogenous communities of class 
and race may be contributing to a schism between middle-class and 
affluent suburbs, on the one hand, and declining localities in the 
urban core, on the other hand, this interlocal competition for pub-
lic and private resources is most pronounced at the state and local 
level. At the national level, where citizen influence over fiscal pol-
icy debates is necessarily attenuated and one national tax base 
bears the burden of any redistributive spending, formal secession is 
impossible and voters apparently feel more comfortable with the 
idea of shared sacrifice.58 At the state and local level, however, 
voters seemingly experience the wrench of government policy 
choices more potently. They are more likely to view state fiscal 
policy debates as about spending "their" money, and they are more 
likely to directly correlate the actions of government with the ser-
vices they receive. At the same time, middle-class suburban inter-
ests compete vigorously for the allocation of public resources in 
fiscal policy debates, and they appear to be winning. 
54. Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform and the Minority Poor: Ac-
counting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 583-91 (1999) 
(citing, inter alia, empirical research demonstrating that median-income voters exert 
decisive influence on the fiscal policy choices of governors). 
55. Id. at 584. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 585 (noting that voters do not display antipathy toward particular types 
of federal spending). 
58. That does not mean, however, that voters are enthusiastic about redistributive 
spending at the national level. Cf id. at 597-98 (noting the limited possibility for 
changing appreciably current distributions of income and wealth); see also text accom-
panying notes 67-75 (discussing presidential politics in the 1990s and beyond). 
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The evidence on education finance supports this trend. For three 
decades, advocates for equal funding in public education have pur-
sued litigation that is typically premised upon state constitution ed-
ucation clauses. To date, about twenty state supreme courts have 
declared their state's system of school finance unconstitutional and 
have ordered remedies.59 A number of state legislatures also have 
taken on school finance reform, even in the absence of a court 
mandate. One study comparing the outcomes of court-ordered 
and voluntary legislative reforms concluded that only when a state 
court ordered a specific remedy did state legislatures effectively 
close the gap in funding between poor and affluent school dis-
trictS.60 In the absence of a court order, school finance reforms did 
not equalize funding between such districts and sometimes they ac-
tually left poor school districts worse off.61 Instead, middle-class 
suburban school districts typically benefited most under any volun-
tary school finance reform.62 
This evidence highlights the structural consequences of political 
fragmentation for public policy choices made at the state level. 
Formal segmentation of the polity sets up a horizontal competition 
for public and private investment, for high-end uses of land, and 
for high-end taxpayers. Those who adhere to Tieboutian63 logic 
view this horizontal competition as healthy for mobile citizen-vot-
ers who have a choice about where to live and work. The dark side 
to this fragmentation, however, is that citizens in their individual 
localities rationally are motivated to maximize benefits for their 
own community and limit fiscal burdens by denying access to popu-
lations and land uses that they perceive as undesirable.64 New lo-
calities in outer-ring developing suburbs, for example, historically 
have resisted taking on any form of affordable housing. Those few 
areas in the country that have meaningful regional fair-share af-
59. For an excellent overview of the equity funding litigation movement, see 
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999). 
60. Cashin, supra note 54, at 587 & n.146 (citing William N. Evans et al., School-
houses, Courthouses, and Statehouses After Serrano, 16 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MOMT. 
10, 28 (1997)). 
61. Cashin, supra note 54, at 587-88 & n.149 (citing Neil D. Theobald & Faith 
Hanna, Ample Provision for Whom?: The Evolution of State Control over School Fi-
nance in Washington, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 7, 22-25 (1991)). 
62. Cashin, supra note 54, at 588 (citing Paul N. Courant & Susanna Loeb, Cen-
tralization of School Finance in Michigan, 16 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MOMT. 114 
(1997)). 
63. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EeoN. 
416 (1956) (arguing that a citizen, as a "consumer-voter," chooses to locate in that 
community which best satisfies his or her pattern of preferences for public goods). 
64. KANTOR, supra note 13, at 164. 
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fordable housing requirements have achieved them as a result of a 
supra-local mandate-a state court order, for example-that was 
necessary to overcome virulent local resistance.65 
I believe that CIDs are likely to magnify this trend. Even though 
most CIDs are not formal municipal islands unto themselves, they 
provide a formal context that distances their residents both fiscally 
and physically from those who live outside the CID. Unlike busi-
ness improvement districts ("BIDs"), in which businesses within 
the district tax themselves in order to make their district more at-
tractive and viable to a public that is invited to enter the BID,66 
CIDs are exclusionary and exclusive entities. 
One can only guess at the impact such privatized governance 
would have on the polity were we to reach a point where the ma-
jority of American homeowners lived in CIDs. If recent trends in 
presidential politics are any guide, I believe this formal contextual-
ization and encouragement of fiscal self-maximization (some would 
say selfishness) will accelerate the suburban politics of the 1990s. 
In the 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential elections, both major polit-
ical parties could not avoid the reality that two-thirds of American 
voters now lived in suburbs.67 With each of these elections, the 
nation witnessed increasing political competition for the hearts and 
minds of suburban voters. 
One manifestation of this competition was the pursuit of puni-
tive policies toward the most disenfranchised. In 1992, then-candi-
date Bill Clinton established his bona fides with suburban voters, 
inter alia, by supporting the death penalty68 and promising to "end 
welfare as we know it."69 In anticipation of his 1996 bid for reelec-
tion, President Clinton signed a welfare reform law70 that many of 
65. Cashin, supra note 35, at 2031-33. 
66. See generally Richard BriffauJt, A Government for Our Time? Business Im-
provement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999) (discussing 
characteristics of BIDs and their contributions to urban life). 
67. DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 5 (1993) (noting that by 1990, more 
than sixty percent of metropolitan area inhabitants lived in suburbs and a majority of 
the jobs in those metropolitan areas were located in suburbs). 
68. JUSTICE POLICY INST., Too LITTLE Too LATE: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PRISON 
LEGACY (2001) ("During his 1992 campaign, to illustrate his resolve, President Clin-
ton actually interrupted his campaigning to return to his home state of Arkansas to 
oversee the execution of mentally retarded death row inmate Ricky Ray Rector."), 
http://www.cjcj.orglciinton/ciinton.html. 
69. E.g., Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 49. 
70. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.c.). 
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his own policy advisors believed was unnecessarily punitive toward 
the pOOr.71 In addition, during his eight years in office, President 
Clinton oversaw the addition of fifty new death penalties to the 
federal penal code and the largest expansion of the prison popula-
tion in American history.72 Although Clinton was touted by Toni 
Morrison as "the first black President,"73 a disproportionate num-
ber of these new prisoners were African Americans,14 Without 
question, the poor and racial minorities benefited from numerous 
Clinton Administration policies.75 My point is that Clinton felt 
compelled to pursue other, more punitive policies that clearly sig-
naled to suburban voters-read whites-that he was a Democrat 
who could be trusted to govern. President George W. Bush's pur-
suit of tax policies that greatly favor affluent voters76 is less obvi-
ously tied to the suburbanization of the electorate. However, 
ironic evidence of how far the center of gravity in American polit-
ics has shifted with decades of suburbanization can be seen when 
one considers that it was a Republican President, Richard Nixon, 
who first proposed a national income floor for welfare recipients.77 
B. Structured Inequality 
CIDs, like homogeneous new suburban localities, may contrib-
ute to structural inequalities in American society. The American 
71. Edelman, supra note 69. 
72. David Cole, Editorial, Faith Succeeds Where Prison Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2001, at A21 (noting that Clinton's "legacy with respect to the crime problem included 
the enactment of more than 50 new federal death penalties and the largest increase in 
the prison population in American history"); see also JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra 
note 68 (noting that during President Clinton's first term 148,000 more state and fed-
eral prisoners were added to the nation's prison system than during President Rea-
gan's first term, and 34,000 more were incarcerated than during President Bush's 
four-year term). 
73. Toni Morrison, The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 1998, at 32. 
74. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 68 (noting that although the African Ameri-
can incarceration rate increased in the twelve years prior to Clinton's term, the rate 
actually doubled during the Clinton era). 
75. E.g., Editorial, An Appraisal: Bill Clinton's Mixed Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2001, § 4, at 16 (noting a "progressive record" of accomplishments, including an ex-
panded Earned Income Tax Credit, a health care program for poor children, the 
doubling of Head Start and school aid for the disadvantaged, and an increase in col-
lege tuition assistance for low- and moderate-income students, such that "an ex-
traordinary $64 billion is now newly channeled annually to working-class and poor 
families"). 
76. E.g., Bill Pascrell Jr., Editorial, Bush's 'Goldilocks' Tax Plan is Irresponsible, 
THE RECORD (N.J.), Apr. 9, 2001, at L3 (stating that President Bush's proposed tax 
plan will provide almost fifty percent of its relief to those earning more than $1.1 
million annually). 
77. Cashin, supra note 54, at 570 n.74. 
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metropolis currently is characterized by differential opportunities 
for many of its citizens based upon where they live. The differ-
ences in the education and economic access available to children of 
outer-ring suburbs compared to that available to children of inner-
city ghettoes are all too obvious.78 Anyone who lives in America 
knows about these differences. Less well known or obvious are the 
differences in opportunity between, for example, middle-class 
black communities and middle-class white ones. Elsewhere, I have 
documented the negative impact of racial isolation on affluent or 
middle-class blacks who live in predominately black settings, dem-
onstrating that the opportunity structure is more precarious in mid-
dle-class black suburbs than in predominately white suburban 
communities.79 CIDs, like homogenous local suburbs, may con-
tribute to fiscal inequalities among communities in the American 
metropolis. Should CIDs predominate in affluent communities, as 
I predict above,80 and should the emerging practice of conferring 
tax adjustments on CID residents become de rigueur, the CID, 
property-owning class will privatize its tax base to a degree. One 
possible consequence of such a development would be the reduc-
tion of revenues available to states and localities to provide needed 
government services outside CID areas. Another consequence of 
CID proliferation also may be to heighten differences in services, 
amenities, and, ultimately, private investment, between CID and 
non-CID communities. 
To the extent that CIDs cultivate reduced empathy for persons 
or problems beyond the CID border, the most potent long-term 
impact of CIDs (and socioeconomic residential segregation) will be 
a reduced tax base for addressing the problems of the poor. Even 
at the federal level, where all U.S. taxpayers must participate, there 
is a risk of increasing resistance on the part of the CID class, and 
78. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 60-82 (discussing the extreme isolation of 
hyper-segregated, inner-city communities where approximately one-third of African 
Americans live); James E. Rosenbaum et aI., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing 
Strategy Improve Employment, Education, and Social Integration for Low-Income 
Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (1993) (documenting the substantial differences in edu-
cation and employment opportunities available to low-income persons who were 
placed in assisted housing in Chicago and its surrounding suburbs). 
79. Middle-class black suburbs tend to be characterized by lower performing 
schools and higher crime rates than their predominately white counterparts; they tend 
to be 180 degrees in the opposite direction from the areas of highest economic 
growth; and they tend to attract low-income minorities, with attendant social service 
demands and social distress. See generally Cashin, supra note 33. 
80. Supra Part I.C. 
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others geographically removed from the poor, to expending federal 
funds for redistributive aims. 
Bringing CIDs or gates to poor or minority communities will not 
equalize the situation and, in some cases, it may even make matters 
worse. As noted, even affluent blacks are harmed by racial isola-
tion.81 Organizing a racially isolated community through the crea-
tion of a CID is not likely to overcome the systematic 
disinvestment by whites and commercial actors that tends to ac-
company racial isolation, particularly of African Americans.82 In 
addition, empirical research on the impact of gating existing low-
income communities suggests that such strategies had little 
impact.83 
CONCLUSION 
CIDs are an inevitable fact of life in the United States. They are 
likely to become a dominant form of private home ownership in 
the next century. They present a very real threat to the social con-
tract in America because they inculcate secessionist attitudes, 
which will be very hard to counter. As CIDs continue to prolifer-
ate, America will need effective public forums in which to mediate 
and negotiate solutions to problems that transcend borders, gates, 
and neighborhoods. Federal and state public officials are best posi-
tioned to pursue policies that mitigate the externalities wrought by 
increasingly atomized and privatized communities. But building a 
consensus or a mandate for public action that requires shared sacri-
fice will be increasingly difficult as the polity continues to separate. 
The best hope for change is the potential for the vast array of 
citizens who do not live in CIDs to build coalitions based upon 
enlightened self-interest. Reversing regional inequity will take 
churches, unions, renters, minority groups, environmentalists, city 
dwellers, commuters disgusted with traffic, and a host of other po-
tential common allies bound together in an effort to pursue en-
lightened public policies that can benefit the entire metropolitan 
region. Policies like regional land use planning, regional tax-base 
sharing, regional affordable housing development, and regional 
81. Supra text accompanying notes 78-79. 
82. Cashin, supra note 33, at 763-65. 
83. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 153-54 (concluding that although 
"[g]ated communities do not in themselves cause discrimination and residential segre-
gation ... they are part of a pattern, with all its attendant effects on economic and 
social opportunity"). 
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governance could put our nation on a course toward more fairness, 
opportunity, and, dare I imagine it, civic engagement.84 
84. E.g., Cashin, supra note 33, at 771-75 (arguing for these regional strategies); 
Peter W. Salsich Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable Housing and Neighbor-
hood Development, 28 STETSON L. REV. 577, 578-79 (1999). 
